Itisinmonarchiesthatwebeholdthesubjectsencirclingthethrone，andcheeredbytheirradiancyofthesovereign；thereitisthateachpersonfilling，asitwere，alargerspace，iscapableofexercisingthosevirtueswhichadornthesoul，notwithindependence，butwithtruedignityandgreatness。

13。AnIdeaofDespoticPower。WhenthesavagesofLouisianaaredesirousoffruit，theycutthetreetotheroot，andgatherthefruit。[35]Thisisanemblemofdespoticgovernment。

14。InwhatMannertheLawsareinrelationtothePrinciplesofDespoticGovernment。Theprincipleofdespoticgovernmentisfear；butatimid，ignorant，andfaint—spiritedpeoplehavenooccasionforagreatnumberoflaws。

Everythingoughttodependhereontwoorthreeideas；hencethereisnonecessitythatanynewnotionsshouldbeadded。Whenwewanttobreakahorse，wetakecarenottolethimchangehismaster，hislesson，orhispace。Thusanimpressionismadeonhisbrainbytwoorthreemotions，andnomore。

Ifaprinceisshutupinaseraglio，hecannotleavehisvoluptuousabodewithoutalarmingthosewhokeephimconfined。Thevwillnotbearthathispersonandpowershouldpassintootherhands。Heseldomthereforewageswarinperson，andhardlyventurestoentrustthecommandtohisgenerals。

Aprinceofthisstamp，unaccustomedtoresistanceinhispalace，isenragedtoseehiswillopposedbyarmedforce；henceheisgenerallygovernedbywrathorvengeance。Besides，hecanhavenonotionoftrueglory。Warthereforeiscarriedonundersuchagovernmentinitsfullnaturalfury，andlessextentisgiventothelawofnationsthaninotherstates。

Suchaprincehassomanyimperfectionsthattheyareafraidtoexposehisnaturalstupiditytopublicview。Heisconcealedinhispalace，andthepeopleareignorantofhissituation。Itisluckyforhimthattheinhabitantsofthosecountriesneedonlythenameofaprincetogovernthem。

WhenCharlesXIIwasatBender，hemetwithsomeoppositionfromthesenateofSweden；uponwhichhewrotewordhomethathewouldsendoneofhisbootstocommandthem。Thisbootwouldhavegovernedlikeadespoticprince。

Iftheprinceisaprisoner，heissupposedtobedead，andanothermountsthethrone。Thetreatiesmadebytheprisonerarevoid，hissuccessorwillnotratifythem；andindeed，asheisthelaw，thestate，andtheprince：whenheisnolongeraprince，heisnothing：werehenotthereforedeemedtobedeceased，thestatewouldbesubverted。

OnethingwhichchieflydeterminedtheTurkstoconcludeaseparatepeacewithPeterIwastheMuscovitestellingtheVizirthatinSwedenanotherprincehadbeenplaceduponthethrone。[36]

Thepreservationofthestateisonlythepreservationoftheprince，orratherofthepalacewhereheisconfined。Whateverdoesnotdirectlymenacethispalaceorthecapitalmakesnoimpressiononignorant，proud，andprejudicedminds；andasfortheconcatenationofevents，theyareunabletotrace，toforesee，oreventoconceiveit。Politics，withitsseveralspringsandlaws，mustherebeverymuchlimited；thepoliticalgovernmentisassimpleasthecivil。[37]

Thewholeisreducedtoreconcilingthepoliticalandciviladministrationtothedomesticgovernment，theofficersofstatetothoseoftheseraglio。

Suchastateishappiestwhenitcanlookuponitselfastheonlyoneintheworld，whenitisenvironedwithdeserts，andseparatedfromthosepeoplewhomtheycallBarbarians。Sinceitcannotdependonthemilitia，itisproperitshoulddestroyapartofitself。

Asfearistheprincipleofdespoticgovernment，itsendistranquillity；butthistranquillitycannotbecalledapeace：no，itisonlythesilenceofthosetownswhichtheenemyisreadytoinvade。

Sincestrengthdoesnotlieinthestate，butinthearmythatfoundedit，inordertodefendthestatethearmymustbepreserved，howformidablesoevertotheprince。How，then，canwereconcilethesecurityofthegovernmenttothatoftheprince’sperson？

ObservehowindustriouslytheRussiangovernmentendeavourstotemperitsarbitrarypower，whichitfindsmoreburdensomethanthepeoplethemselves。Theyhavebrokentheirnumerousguards，mitigatedcriminalpunishments，erectedtribunals，enteredintoaknowledgeofthelaws，andinstructedthepeople。Butthereareparticularcausesthatwillprobablyoncemoreinvolvethemintheverymiserywhichtheynowendeavourtoavoid。

Inthosestatesreligionhasmoreinfluencethananywhereelse；itisfearaddedtofear。InMahomedancountries，itispartlyfromtheirreligionthatthepeoplederivethesurprisingvenerationtheyhavefortheirprince。

ItisreligionthatamendsinsomemeasuretheTurkishconstitution。Thesubjects，whohavenoattachmentofhonourtothegloryandgrandeurofthestate，areconnectedwithitbytheforceandprincipleofreligion。

Ofalldespoticgovernmentsthereisnonethatlaboursmoreunderitsownweightthanthatwhereintheprincedeclareshimselfproprietorofallthelands，andheirtoallhissubjects。Hencetheneglectofagriculturearises；andiftheprinceintermeddleslikewiseintrade，allmannerofindustryisruined。

Underthissortofgovernment，nothingisrepairedorimproved。[38]

Housesarebuiltonlyforthenecessityofhabitation；thereisnodiggingofditchesorplantingoftrees；everythingisdrawnfrom，butnothingrestoredto，theearth；thegroundliesuntilled，andthewholecountrybecomesadesert。

Isittobeimaginedthatthelawswhichabolishthepropertyoflandandthesuccessionofestateswilldiminishtheavariceandcupidityofthegreat？Bynomeans。Theywillratherstimulatethiscupidityandavarice。Thegreatmenwillbepromptedtouseathousandoppressivemethods，imaginingtheyhavenootherpropertythanthegoldandsilverwhichtheyareabletoseizeuponbyviolence，ortoconceal。

Toprevent，therefore，theutterruinofthestate，theavidityoftheprinceoughttobemoderatedbysomeestablishedcustom。Thus，inTurkey，thesovereignissatisfiedwiththerightofthreepercentonthevalueofinheritances。[39]Butashegivesthegreatestpartofthelandstohissoldiery，anddisposesofthemashepleases；asheseizesonalltheinheritancesoftheofficersoftheempireattheirdecease；

ashehasthepropertyofthepossessionsofthosewhodiewithoutissue，andthedaughtershaveonlytheusufruct；itthencefollowsthatthegreatestpartoftheestatesofthecountryareheldinaprecariousmanner。

BythelawsofBantam，[40]thekingseizesonthewholeinheritance，evenwife，children，andhabitation。Inordertoeludethecruelestpartofthislaw，theyareobligedtomarrytheirchildrenateight，nine，ortenyearsofage，andsometimesyounger，totheendthattheymaynotbeawretchedpartofthefather’ssuccession。

Incountrieswheretherearenofundamentallaws，thesuccessiontotheempirecannotbefixed。Thecrownisthenelective，andtherightofelectingisintheprince，whonamesasuccessoreitherofhisownorofsomeotherfamily。Invainwoulditbetoestablishherethesuccessionoftheeldestson；theprincemightalwayschooseanother。Thesuccessorisdeclaredbytheprincehimself，orbyacivilwar。Henceadespoticstateis，uponanotheraccount，moreliablethanamonarchicalgovernmenttodissolution。

Aseveryprinceoftheroyalfamilyisheldequallycapableofbeingchosen，henceitfollowsthattheprincewhoascendsthethroneimmediatelystrangleshisbrothers，asinTurkey；orputsouttheireyes，asinPersia；orbereavesthemoftheirunderstanding，asintheMogul’scountry；oriftheseprecautionsarenotused，asinMorocco，thevacancyofthethroneisalwaysattendedwiththehorrorsofacivilwar。

BytheconstitutionofRussia[41]theCzarmaychoosewhomhehasamindforhissuccessor，whetherofhisownorofastrangefamily。Suchasettlementproducesathousandrevolutions，andrendersthethroneastotteringasthesuccessionisarbitrary。Therightofsuccessionbeingoneofthosethingswhichareofmostimportancetothepeopletoknow，thebestisthatwhichmostsensiblystrikesthem。Suchasacertainorderofbirth。Asettlementofthiskindputsastoptointrigues，andstiflesambition；themindofaweakprinceisnolongerenslaved，norishemadetospeakhiswillasheisjustexpiring。

Whenthesuccessionisestablishedbyafundamentallaw，onlyoneprinceisthesuccessor，andhisbrothershaveneitherarealnorapparentrighttodisputethecrownwithhim。Theycanneitherpretendtonortakeanyadvantageofthewillofafather。Thereisthennomoreoccasiontoconfineorkilltheking’sbrotherthananyothersubject。

Butindespoticgovernments，wheretheprince’sbrothersareequallyhisslavesandhisrivals，prudencerequiresthattheirpersonsbesecured；

especiallyinMahomedancountries，wherereligionconsidersvictoryorsuccessasadivinedecisionintheirfavour；sothattheyhavenosuchthingasamonarchdejure，butonlydefacto。

Thereisafargreaterincentivetoambitionincountrieswheretheprincesofthebloodaresensiblethatiftheydonotascendthethronetheymustbeeitherimprisonedorputtodeath，thanamongus，wheretheyareplacedinsuchastationasmaysatisfy，ifnottheirambition，atleasttheirmoderatedesires。

Theprincesofdespoticgovernmentshaveeverpervertedtheuseofmarriage。Theygenerallytakeagreatmanywives，especiallyinthatpartoftheworldwhereabsolutepowerisinsomemeasurenaturalised，namely，Asia。Hencetheycometohavesuchamultitudeofchildrenthattheycanhardlyhaveanygreataffectionforthem，northechildrenforoneanother。

Thereigningfamilyresemblesthestate；itistooweakitself，anditsheadtoopowerful；itseemsverynumerousandextensive，andyetissuddenlyextinct。Artaxerxes[42]putallhischildrentodeathforconspiringagainsthim。

Itisnotatallprobablethatfiftychildrenwouldconspireagainsttheirfather，andmuchlessthatthisconspiracywouldbeowingtohishavingrefusedtoresignhisconcubinetohiseldestson。Itismorenaturaltobelievethatthewholewasanintrigueofthoseorientalseraglios，wherefraud，treachery，anddeceitreigninsilenceanddarkness；andwhereanoldprince，growneverydaymoreinfirm，isthefirstprisonerofthepalace。

Afterwhathasbeensaid，onewouldimaginethathumannatureshouldperpetuallyriseupagainstdespotism。Butnotwithstandingtheloveofliberty，sonaturaltomankind，notwithstandingtheirinnatedetestationofforceandviolence，mostnationsaresubjecttothisverygovernment。

Thisiseasilyaccountedfor。Toformamoderategovernment，itisnecessarytocombinetheseveralpowers；toregulate，temper，andsettheminmotion；togive，asitwere，ballasttoone，inordertoenableittocounterpoisetheother。Thisisamasterpieceoflegislation；

rarelyproducedbyhazard，andseldomattainedbyprudence。Onthecontrary，adespoticgovernmentoffersitself，asitwere，atfirstsight；itisuniformthroughout；andaspassionsonlyarerequisitetoestablishit，thisiswhateverycapacitymayreach。

15。ThesameSubjectcontinued。Inwarmclimates，wheredespoticpowergenerallyprevails，thepassionsdisclosethemselvesearlier，andaresoonerextinguished；[43]theunderstandingissoonerripened；theyarelessindangerofsquanderingtheirfortunes；thereislessfacilityofdistinguishingthemselvesintheworld；lesscommunicationbetweenyoungpeople，whoareconfinedathome；theymarrymuchearlier，andconsequentlymaybesoonerofagethaninourEuropeanclimates。InTurkeytheyareofageatfifteen。[44]

Theyhavenosuchthingasacessionofgoods；inagovernmentwherethereisnofixedproperty，peopledependratheronthepersonthanonhisestate。

Thecessionofgoodsisnaturallyadmittedinmoderategovernments，[45]

butespeciallyinrepublics，becauseofthegreaterconfidenceusuallyplacedintheprobityofthecitizens，andthelenityandmoderationarisingfromaformofgovernmentwhicheverysubjectseemstonavepreferredtoallothers。

HadthelegislatorsoftheRomanrepublicestablishedthecessionofgoods，[46]theyneverwouldhavebeenexposedtosomanyseditionsandcivildiscords；neitherwouldtheyhaveexperiencedthedangeroftheevils，northeinconvenienceoftheremedies。

Povertyandtheprecariousnessofpropertyinadespoticstaterenderusurynatural，eachpersonraisingthevalueofhismoneyinproportiontothedangerheseesinlendingit。Miserythereforepoursfromallpartsintothoseunhappycountries；theyarebereftofeverything，evenoftheresourceofborrowing。

Henceitisthatamerchantunderthisgovernmentisunabletocarryonanextensivecommerce；helivesfromhandtomouth；andwerehetoencumberhimselfwithalargequantityofmerchandise，hewouldlosemorebytheexorbitantinteresthemustgiveformoneythanhecouldpossiblygetbythegoods。Hencetheyhavenolawshererelatingtocommerce；theyareallreducedtowhatiscalledthebarepolice。

Agovernmentcannotbeunjustwithouthavinghandstoexerciseitsinjustice。Now，itisimpossiblebutthatthesehandswillbegraspingforthemselves。Theembezzlingofthepublicmoneyisthereforenaturalindespoticstates。

Asthisisacommoncrimeundersuchagovernment，confiscationsareveryuseful。Bythesethepeopleareeased；themoneydrawnbythismethodbeingaconsiderabletributewhichcouldhardlyberaisedontheexhaustedsubject：neitheristhereinthosecountriesanyonefamilywhichtheprincewouldbegladtopreserve。

Inmoderategovernmentsitisquiteadifferentthing。Confiscationswouldrenderpropertyuncertain，wouldstripinnocentchildren，woulddestroyawholefamily，insteadofpunishingasinglecriminal。Inrepublicstheywouldbeattendedwiththemischiefofsubvertingequality，whichistheverysoulofthisgovernment，bydeprivingacitizenofhisnecessarysubsistence。[47]

ThereisaRomanlaw[48]againstconfiscations，exceptinthecaseofcrimenmajestatis，orhightreasonofthemostheinousnature。Itwouldbeaprudentthingtofollowthespiritofthislaw，andtolimitconfiscationstoparticularcrimes。Incountrieswherealocalcustomhasrenderedrealestatesalienable，Bodinveryjustlyobservesthatconfiscationsshouldextendonlytosuchasarepurchasedoracquired。[49]

16。OftheCommunicationofPower。Inadespoticgovernmentthepoweriscommunicatedentiretothepersonentrustedwithit。Thevizirhimselfisthedespoticprince；andeachparticularofficeristhevizir。Inmonarchiesthepowerislessimmediatelyapplied，beingtemperedbythemonarchashegivesit。[50]Hemakessuchadistributionofhisauthorityasnevertocommunicateapartofitwithoutreservingagreatersharetohimself。

Henceinmonarchiesthegovernorsoftownsarenotsodependentonthegovernoroftheprovinceasnottobestillmoresoontheprince；andtheprivateofficersormilitarybodiesarenotsofarsubjecttotheirgeneralasnottoowestillagreatersubjectiontotheirsovereign。

Inmostmonarchiesithasbeenwiselyregulatedthatthosewhohaveanextensivecommandshouldnotbelongtoanymilitarycorps；sothatastheyhavenoauthoritybutthroughtheprince’spleasure，andastheymaybeemployedornot，theyareinsomemeasureintheservice，andinsomemeasureoutofit。

Thisisincompatiblewithadespoticgovernment。Forifthosewhoarenotactuallyemployedwerestillinvestedwithprivilegesandtitles，theconsequencemustbethattherewouldbemeninthestatewhomightbesaidtobegreatofthemselves；athingdirectlyoppositetothenatureofthisgovernment。

Werethegovernorofatownindependentofthepasha，expedientswouldbedailynecessarytomakethemagree；whichishighlyabsurdinadespoticstate。Besides，ifaparticulargovernorshouldrefusetoobey，howcouldtheotheranswerforhisprovincewithhishead？

Inthiskindofgovernment，authoritymusteverbewavering；noristhatofthelowestmagistratemoresteadythanthatofthedespoticprince。

Undermoderategovernments，thelawisprudentinallitsparts，andperfectlywellknown，sothateventhepettiestmagistratesarecapableoffollowingit。Butinadespoticstate，wheretheprince’swillisthelaw，thoughtheprincewerewise，yethowcouldthemagistratefollowawillhedoesnotknow？Hemustcertainlyfollowhisown。

Again，asthelawisonlytheprince’swill，andastheprincecanonlywillwhatheknows，theconsequenceisthatthereareaninfinitenumberofpeoplewhomustwillforhim，andmaketheirwillskeeppacewithhis。Infine，asthelawisthemomentarywilloftheprince，itisnecessarythatthosewhowillforhimshouldfollowhissuddenmannerofwilling。

17。OfPresents。Itisareceivedcustomindespoticcountriesnevertoaddressanysuperiorwhomsoever，notexceptingtheirkings，withoutmakingthemapresent。TheMogul[51]neverreceivesthepetitionsofhissubjectsiftheycomewithemptyhands。Theseprincesspoileventheirownfavours。

Butthusitmusteverbeinagovernmentwherenomanisacitizen；

wheretheyhaveallanotionthatasuperiorisundernoobligationtoaninferior；wheremenimaginethemselvesboundbynoothertiethanthechastisementsinflictedbyonepartyuponanother；where，infine，thereisverylittletodo，andwherethepeoplehaveseldomanoccasionofpresentingthemselvesbeforethegreat，ofofferingtheirpetitions，andmuchlesstheircomplaints。

Inarepublic，presentsareodious，becausevirtuestandsinnoneedofthem。Inmonarchies，honourisamuchstrongerincentivethanpresents。

Butinadespoticgovernment，wherethereisneitherhonournorvirtue，peoplecannotbedeterminedtoactbutthroughhopeoftheconveniencesoflife。

ItisinconformitywithrepublicanideasthatPlato[52]orderedthosewhoreceivedpresentsfordoingtheirdutytobepunishedwithdeath。

"Theymustnottakepresents，"sayshe，"neitherforgoodnorforevilactions。"

AverybadlawwasthatamongtheRomans[53]whichgavethemagistratesleavetoacceptsmallpresents[[54]providedtheydidnotexceedonehundredcrownsinthewholeyear。Theywhoreceivenothingexpectnothing；theywhoreceivealittlesooncovetmore，tillatlengththeirdesiresswelltoanexorbitantheight。

Besides，itismucheasiertoconvictamanwhoknowshimselfobligedtoacceptnopresentatall，andyetwillacceptsomething，thanapersonwhotakesmorewhenheoughttotakeless，andwhoalwaysfindspretexts，excuses，andplausiblereasonsinjustificationofhisconduct。

18。OfRewardsconferredbytheSovereign。Indespoticgovernments，where，aswehavealreadyobserved，theprincipalmotiveofactionisthehopeoftheconveniencesoflife，theprincewhoconfersrewardshasnothingtobestowbutmoney。Inmonarchies，wherehonouralonepredominates，theprince’srewardswouldconsistonlyofmarksofdistinction，ifthedistinctionsestablishedbyhonourwerenotattendedwithluxury，whichnecessarilybringsonitswants：theprincethereforeisobligedtoconfersuchhonoursasleadtowealth。Butinarepublicwherevirtuereigns——amotiveself—sufficient，andwhichexcludesallothers——therecompensesofthestateconsistonlyofpublicattestationsofthisvirtue。

Itisageneralrulethatgreatrewardsinmonarchiesandrepublicsareasignoftheirdecline；becausetheyareaproofoftheirprinciplesbeingcorrupted，andthattheideaofhonourhasnolongerthesameforceinamonarchy，northetitleofcitizenthesameweightinarepublic。

TheveryworstRomanemperorswerethosewhoweremostprofuseintheirlargesses；forexample，Caligula，Claudius，Nero，Otho，Vitellius，Commodus，Heliogabalus，andCaracalla。Thebest，asAugustus，Vespasian，AntoninusPius，MarcusAurelius，andPertinax，wereeconomists。Undergoodemperorsthestateresumeditsprinciples；allothertreasuresweresuppliedbythatofhonour。

19。NewConsequencesofthePrinciplesofthethreeGovernments。I

cannotconcludethisbookwithoutmakingsomeapplicationsofmythreeprinciples。

1stQuestion。]Itisaquestionwhetherthelawsoughttoobligeasubjecttoacceptapublicemployment。Myopinionisthattheyoughtinarepublic，butnotinamonarchicalgovernment。Intheformer，publicemploymentsareattestationsofvirtue，depositionswithwhichacitizenisentrustedbyhiscountry，forwhosesakealoneheoughttolive，toact，andtothink，consequentlyliecannotrefusethem。[55]Inthelatter，publicofficesaretestimonialsofhonour；nowsuchisthecapriciousnessofhonourthatitchoosestoacceptnoneofthesetestimoniesbutwhenandinwhatmanneritpleases。

ThelateKingofSardinia[56]inflictedpunishmentsonhissubjectswhorefusedthedignitiesandpublicofficesofthestate。Inthisheunknowinglyfollowedrepublicanideas：buthismethodofgoverninginotherrespectssufficientlyprovesthatthiswasnothisintention。

2ndQuestion。]Secondly，itisquestionedwhetherasubjectshouldbeobligedtoacceptapostinthearmyinferiortothatwhichheheldbefore。AmongtheRomansitwasusualtoseeacaptainservethenextyearunderhislieutenant。[57]Thisisbecausevirtueinrepublicsrequiresacontinualsacrificeofourpersonsandofourrepugnancesforthegoodofthestate。Butinmonarchies，honour，trueorfalse，willneverbearwithwhatitcallsdegradingitself。

Indespoticgovernments，wherehonour，posts，andranksareequallyabused，theyindiscriminatelymakeaprinceascullion，andascullionaprince。

3rdQuestion。]Thirdly，itmaybeinquired，whethercivilandmilitaryemploymentsshouldbeconferredonthesameperson。InrepublicsIthinktheyshouldbejoined，butinmonarchiesseparated。Intheformeritwouldbeextremelydangeroustomaketheprofessionofarmsaparticularstate，distinctfromthatofcivilfunctions；andinthelatter，nolessdangerouswoulditbetoconferthesetwoemploymentsonthesameperson。

Inrepublicsapersontakesuparmsonlywithaviewtodefendhiscountryanditslaws；itisbecauseheisacitizenhemakeshimselfforawhileasoldier。Werethesetwodistinctstates，thepersonwhounderarmsthinkshimselfacitizenwouldsoonbemadesensibleheisonlyasoldier。

Inmonarchies，theywhoseconditionengagesthemintheprofessionofarmshavenothingbutglory，oratleasthonourorfortune，inview。Tomen，therefore，likethese，theprinceshouldnevergiveanycivilemployments；onthecontrary，theyoughttobecheckedbythecivilmagistrate，thatthesamepersonsmaynothaveatthesametimetheconfidenceofthepeopleandthepowertoabuseit。[58]

Wehaveonlytocastaneyeonanationthatmaybejustlycalledarepublic，disguisedundertheformofmonarchy，andweshallseehowjealoustheyareofmakingaseparateorderoftheprofessionofarms，andhowthemilitarystateisconstantlyalliedwiththatofthecitizen，andevensometimesofthemagistrate，totheendthatthesequalitiesmaybeapledgefortheircountry，whichshouldneverbeforgotten。

Thedivisionofcivilandmilitaryemployments，madebytheRomansaftertheextinctionoftherepublic，wasnotanarbitrarything。ItwasaconsequenceofthechangewhichhappenedintheconstitutionofRome；itwasnaturaltoamonarchicalgovernment；andwhatwasonlycommencedunderAugustus[59]succeedingemperors[60]wereobligedtofinish，inordertotemperthemilitarygovernment。

Procopius，therefore，thecompetitorofValenstheemperor，wasverymuchtoblamewhen，conferringthepro—consulardignity[61]uponHormisdas，aprinceofthebloodroyalofPersia，herestoredtothismagistracythemilitarycommandofwhichithadbeenformerlypossessed；

unlessindeedhehadveryparticularreasonsforsodoing。Apersonthataspirestothesovereigntyconcernshimselflessaboutwhatisserviceabletothestatethanwhatislikelytopromotehisowninterest。

4thQuestion。]Fourthly，itisaquestionwhetherpublicemploymentsshouldbesold。Theyoughtnot，Ithink，indespoticgovernments，wherethesubjectsmustbeinstantaneouslyplacedordisplacedbytheprince。

Butinmonarchiesthiscustomisnotatallimproper，byreasonitisaninducementtoengageinthatasafamilyemploymentwhichwouldnotbeundertakenthroughamotiveofvirtue；itfixeslikewiseeveryoneinhisduty，andrenderstheseveralordersofthekingdommorepermanent。

SuidasveryjustlyobservesthatAnastasiushadchangedtheempireintoakindofaristocracy，bysellingallpublicemployments。

Plato[62]cannotbearwiththisprostitution："Thisisexactly，"sayshe，"asifapersonweretobemadeamarinerorpilotofashipforhismoney。Isitpossiblethatthisruleshouldbebadineveryotheremploymentoflife，andholdgoodonlyintheadministrationofarepublic？"ButPlatospeaksofarepublicfoundedonvirtue，andweofamonarchy。Now，inmonarchies（where，thoughtherewerenosuchthingasaregularsaleofpublicoffices，stilltheindigenceandavidityofthecourtierwouldequallyprompthimtoexposethemtosale）chancewillfurnishbettersubjectsthantheprince’schoice。Inshort，themethodofattainingtohonoursthroughrichesinspiresandcherishesindustry，[63]athingextremelywantinginthiskindofgovernment。

5thQuestion。]Thefifthquestionisinwhatkindofgovernmentcensorsarenecessary。Myansweris，thattheyarenecessaryinarepublic，wheretheprincipleofgovernmentisvirtue。Wemustnotimaginethatcriminalactionsonlyaredestructiveofvirtue；itisdestroyedalsobyomissions，byneglects，byacertaincoolnessintheloveofourcountry，bybadexamples，andbytheseedsofcorruption：whateverdoesnotopenlyviolatebuteludethelaws，doesnotsubvertbutweakenthem，oughttofallundertheinquiryandcorrectionofthecensors。